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Date: 11-07-2020
Case Style:
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA v. KEVIN ALLAN KRUEGER
Case Number: 2020 S.D. 57
Judge: Mark E. Salter
Court: IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
Plaintiff's Attorney: JASON R. RAVNSBORG
Attorney General
PATRICIA ARCHER
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Brookings, SD - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant Kevin Krueger charged with first-degree murder.
[¶2.] Law enforcement officers in Beadle County had been searching
unsuccessfully for Keith Houck during late May and early June of 2016, for reasons
unrelated to this case. On June 2, 2016, local resident Trent Jankord reported to
Huron Police that Houck was missing or had possibly been killed. Special Agent
Brent Spencer of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI)
interviewed Jankord that day.
[¶3.] Following the interview, Agent Spencer went to Houck’s rural Huron
residence. Spencer observed that neither Houck nor his vehicle or two dogs were
home. He also noted a window of the residence was completely broken out.
Spencer’s attempts to reach Houck by phone were also unsuccessful as was a return
trip to Houck’s farm the following day. Later that evening, Spencer received
information through the Huron Police Department that Houck had been killed, and
his body was located at Kevin Krueger’s farm near Cavour.
[¶4.] The source of the information was Krueger himself who had gone
unprompted to the home of Beadle County Deputy Sheriff Shane Ball and confessed
to killing Houck. The visit was peculiar and occurred at approximately 8:00 p.m. on
June 3 while Ball was off duty. Krueger was a passenger in a truck driven by his
girlfriend, Bonnie Goehring. Ball was outside and went to meet the truck as it
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drove up. He recognized Krueger and later testified at trial that he had asked the
couple “what was up?”
[¶5.] Deputy Ball recalled that Goehring asked him if he had the phone
number for the Beadle County Sheriff. When Ball told Goehring the sheriff was out
of town, she gestured toward Krueger as if to suggest he had something to say. Ball
testified that Krueger kept his head down and spoke quietly, asking Ball if he was
looking for Houck. Ball responded that he believed local law enforcement officers
had been looking for Houck recently. Krueger then told Ball, “[Houck] was dead.”
According to Ball, Krueger paused then stated, “[H]e was buried at my farm.” Ball
asked, “[W]hy is that?” and Krueger answered, “[B]ecause I hit him with a bat.”
[¶6.] Deputy Ball testified that he called 911 and requested that an officer
come to his home. During the brief time before the officer arrived, Ball stated that
Krueger told him Houck “kept messing” with his family and he “had enough.”
Krueger was arrested and transported to the Beadle County Detention Center.
[¶7.] Agent Spencer’s earlier efforts to locate Houck quickly turned into a
homicide investigation. He sought and obtained several search warrants, including
one for Krueger’s farm. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours of
June 4. Agent Spencer and Agent Neitzert located Houck’s disfigured body under
some tarps and tires at Krueger’s farm.
[¶8.] Agent Spencer and other law enforcement officers searched Houck’s
residence. They located two empty gun boxes in a closet. One of the missing guns
was quickly located inside a leather holster on the floor of Krueger’s pickup truck.
The second gun was turned over to Spencer approximately one year later by the
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family of Jose Antonio Vega, who investigators determined early on was also
complicit in Houck’s death.
[¶9.] Forensic pathologist Kenneth Snell, M.D., performed an autopsy and
concluded that Houck’s death was a homicide caused by blunt force injury to the
head administered through two lethal blows. Officers had discovered a baseball bat
located near Houck’s body that was marked with several stains. The bat was sent
to the South Dakota State Forensic Laboratory (state crime laboratory) for testing.
[¶10.] Krueger was indicted by a Beadle County grand jury and charged with
first-degree murder under the theory that he killed Houck with a premeditated
design to effect his death. See SDCL 22-16-4(1). Vega was also charged with firstdegree murder in connection with Houck’s death in a separate indictment. The
cases were not consolidated.
[¶11.] Krueger filed a motion for change of venue on March 24, 2017.1 The
motion attached seven articles published in the local Huron newspaper. Following
a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, but stated, “[W]e will take it up again
after the Vega trial[,]” which was scheduled first. Ultimately, however, Vega’s case
was not tried, and he instead pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter pursuant to a
1. In connection with the motion to change venue, Krueger also sought, among
other things, to exclude the press from the courthouse until the jury was
empaneled and to prohibit news coverage of pretrial and voir dire
proceedings. The circuit court denied relief, and those rulings are not at
issue here.
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plea agreement with the State.2 Krueger did not renew the motion for change of
venue, and the circuit court did not revisit the issue on its own.
[¶12.] Krueger’s case was tried to a jury over the course of four days. During
voir dire, Krueger’s counsel questioned individual prospective jurors concerning
their responses to a juror questionnaire sent out months earlier. In addition to
general biographical information, the questionnaire sought responses regarding
potential jurors’ knowledge of the case and any opinions they may have formed,
including their views about the fact that Vega had pled guilty. At the conclusion of
voir dire, counsel for both parties passed the panel for cause and selected fourteen
jurors, two of whom were later designated as alternates.
[¶13.] The State called six witnesses at trial. Dr. Snell testified about his
autopsy findings, including his determination that both the right and left sides of
Houck’s skull had fractures that radiated forward. According to Dr. Snell, the
fractures were traumatic injuries and were consistent with blows from a baseball
bat. Dr. Snell also noted several other non-fatal contusions during Houck’s autopsy
that could have been caused by a baseball bat or by kicking.
[¶14.] Amber Bell, a forensic scientist with the state crime laboratory,
testified concerning the methods used in her DNA analysis of physical evidence,
which included the bat and black Velcro tennis shoes seized from Krueger. She
explained that swabs taken from the barrel of the bat indicated a mixture of DNA
from two individuals. The main contributor of the DNA was Houck, but the DNA
2. The circuit court sentenced Vega to 50 years in prison.
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testing for the second contributor was inconclusive. Bell’s analysis of samples
excised from the black Velcro shoes revealed DNA from a single source, Houck.
[¶15.] Agent Spencer testified that he seized the pair of black Velcro tennis
shoes from Krueger’s personal belongings retained by the jail after Krueger’s arrest
and detention. Because the shoes were stained, Spencer explained that he sent the
shoes to the state crime laboratory for testing, detailing the steps he took to
package, seal, and document the evidence. A photograph of the shoes was admitted
into evidence. However, the circuit court refused to admit the shoes after
determining that Bell had testified only that she had analyzed samples taken from
a pair of black Velcro shoes without identifying the particular shoes the State
sought to introduce.
[¶16.] The State’s theory of the case was that Krueger lured Houck to
Krueger’s farm with the intent to kill him and had enlisted Vega’s assistance. To
support its theory, the State presented a detailed timeline of Krueger’s separate
communications with Vega, Goehring, and Houck, developed from a series of
telephone calls and text messages. Included were texts from Krueger instructing
Goehring to tell Houck he should come to Krueger’s farm to collect money Houck
claimed Goehring owed him. Krueger also texted Houck directly, asking when
Houck would come to his farm to get the money. In another series of text messages,
Krueger asked Vega whether he had purchased “40 rounds” of ammunition,
followed by a subsequent message stating, “[S]howtime.”
[¶17.] Agent Spencer also testified about eight notes Krueger wrote while in
pretrial custody. In one note intended for Vega, who was housed in the same jail,
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Krueger stated he had arranged for a lawyer to represent them and to “stay cool.”
The note also indicated, “There is no way we can say the exaxt [sic] same thing. . .”
and encouraged Vega to “Hangtight.” Another of Krueger’s notes included a
message to DCI agents and asked, “What lie to [sic] you tell Tony [Vega] You have
wrong person. He didn’t do it.”
[¶18.] At the close of the State’s evidence, Krueger moved for judgment of
acquittal, which the circuit court denied. The court also denied Krueger’s motion to
strike Bell’s testimony regarding the DNA found on the black Velcro shoes.
Krueger elected to rest without presenting any evidence. During closing argument,
Krueger’s attorney told the jurors that the State’s evidence was too spare and left
too many unanswered questions about the specifics of Houck’s death due, in large
part, to its failure to call Vega or Jankord as witnesses.
[¶19.] During the State’s closing rebuttal argument, the prosecutor
responded to defense counsel’s argument that individual jurors must be able to
explain their verdict to the larger Huron community. In doing so, the prosecutor
mentioned a private conversation with Houck’s father, Don, who was not called as a
witness, telling the jury, “[Don] says the defendant killed my boy. He killed my
boy.” Krueger objected claiming the argument was improper, and the circuit court
sustained the objection. Krueger made no further objection and did not ask the
court to strike the comment or instruct the jury to disregard it.
[¶20.] The jury returned a guilty verdict on the first-degree murder charge,
and the circuit court imposed a mandatory life sentence. Krueger has identified five
issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
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1. Whether the circuit court erred when it denied Krueger’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it
denied Krueger’s motion to change venue or committed
plain error when it did not reconsider its ruling.
3. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it
refused to strike expert testimony regarding DNA
recovered from the black Velcro shoes.
4. Whether the circuit court committed error by failing to
strike the State’s comments during closing argument or
issue a curative instruction.
5. Whether the circuit court’s cumulative errors deprived
Krueger of a fair trial.
Analysis and Decision
1. Whether the circuit court erred when it denied Krueger’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
[¶21.] “The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is a question of law
we review de novo.” State v. Harruff, 2020 S.D. 4, ¶ 15, 939 N.W.2d 20, 25. On
appeal, we “decide anew whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction.
In measuring evidentiary sufficiency, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Patterson, 2017 S.D. 64, ¶ 27, 904 N.W.2d 43, 51 (quoting State v. Thomason, 2014
S.D. 18, ¶ 14, 845 N.W.2d 640, 643). “We accept the evidence and the most
favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.”
Harruff, 2020 S.D. 4, ¶ 15, 939 N.W.2d at 25 (quoting State v. Brim, 2010 S.D. 74, ¶
6, 789 N.W.2d 80, 83). We “will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the
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credibility of witnesses, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Brim,
2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6, 789 N.W.2d at 83).
[¶22.] “Homicide is murder in the first degree . . . [i]f perpetrated without
authority of law and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person
killed . . . .” SDCL 22-16-4(1). “Premeditated design to effect death” is defined by
SDCL 22-16-5 as:
an intention, purpose, or determination to kill or take the life of
the person killed, distinctly formed and existing in the mind of
the perpetrator before committing the act resulting in the death
of the person killed. A premeditated design to effect death
sufficient to constitute murder may be formed instantly before
committing the act.
[¶23.] The circuit court correctly identified the elements of first-degree
murder as: (1) The defendant caused the death of the victim; (2) The defendant did
so with a premeditated design to effect the death; (3) The killing was not excusable
or justifiable. SDCL 22-16-4(1). The court also instructed the jury that “[a]
defendant may be found guilty of [m]urder . . . even if the defendant did not commit
the act or acts constituting the crime but aided, abetted or advised in its
commission.” See SDCL 22-3-3 (providing criminal liability as a principal for those
who aid and abet in the commission of a crime). The court further advised the jury
that “[t]he mere presence alone of the defendant at the scene of a crime is not
sufficient to make that person an aider and abettor[,]” but “[t]he presence of an
accused at the scene of a crime, together with evidence of companionship and
conduct before and after the offense is committed, may warrant an inference of
guilt.”
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[¶24.] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is
sufficient evidence to sustain Krueger’s conviction for first-degree murder. The case
against Krueger began rather dramatically when he and Goehring drove to Deputy
Ball’s home so that Krueger could confess to killing Houck. Unprompted by any
investigation or suspicion by law enforcement officers, Krueger volunteered that he
had killed Houck by hitting him with a baseball bat and had buried his body at his
farm.
[¶25.] Agents executed a search warrant of Krueger’s farm within hours and
found Houck’s body, which bore signs of a violent death. Nearby, they also
recovered a baseball bat, which testing later revealed contained Houck’s DNA. Dr.
Snell confirmed that Houck had been killed by blunt force trauma inflicted to his
head. Officers later discovered missing firearms from Houck’s residence that were
traced to Krueger and Vega.
[¶26.] Text messages between Krueger and Vega also point to a premeditated
design to kill Houck. Krueger told Deputy Ball that he believed Houck was
harassing members of his family, and the jury could have logically determined this
tension is what motivated Krueger to murder Houck. The text messages support
this view of the evidence and suggest a plan to lure Houck to Krueger’s farm and
murder him.3
3. Krueger’s confession, with this degree of independent corroboration, is itself
sufficient to sustain his conviction. See State v. Plastow, 2015 S.D. 100, ¶ 20,
873 N.W.2d 222, 229 (holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction where the elements are established by “the defendant’s
corroborated confession or admission, independent evidence of the crime, or a
combination thereof . . . .”).
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[¶27.] Beyond this, Houck’s DNA was found on Krueger’s shoes. As
indicated, Dr. Snell’s testimony established that Houck had also sustained nonlethal blows that an assailant may have inflicted by kicking. Under the
circumstances, the presence of the DNA evidence supports the reasonable inference
that Krueger participated in Houck’s murder. In this regard, it is not consequential
whether he actually murdered Houck or personally inflicted the fatal blows. The
jury was properly instructed that Krueger could also be found guilty as a principal
under an aider and abettor theory and was further advised that Krueger’s mere
presence alone would not sustain a finding of guilt. See State v. Schafer, 297
N.W.2d 473, 477 (S.D. 1980) (approving jury instruction that provided “the mere
presence alone of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to make him an
aider and abett[o]r”).
[¶28.] Krueger’s arguments that there was no direct physical evidence
connecting him to Houck’s death, no eyewitnesses to the murder, and insufficient
proof of anything other than Krueger’s mere presence at the farm are not
convincing. These claims are essentially an effort to relitigate the evidence and
overlook our deferential standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence.
This well-established standard forbids us from reweighing evidence the jury has
already considered and instead requires us to indulge every reasonable inference in
favor of the jury’s verdict. Applying the correct standard, we conclude there is
sufficient evidence to sustain Krueger’s first-degree murder conviction.
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2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it
denied Krueger’s motion to change venue or committed
plain error when it did not reconsider its ruling.
[¶29.] A circuit court’s determination of “[w]hether a change of venue should
be granted is a matter within the sound discretion of [the court] and that decision
will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 477
N.W.2d 27, 32 (S.D. 1991). “An abuse of discretion ‘is a fundamental error of
judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which on full
consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.’” State v. Delehoy, 2019 S.D. 30, ¶ 22,
929 N.W.2d 103, 109 (quoting Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 2013 S.D. 63, ¶
11, 836 N.W.2d 611, 616).
[¶30.] “In a criminal case, a change of venue shall be ordered upon motion if
the court is satisfied that there exists, in the county where the prosecution is
pending, so great a prejudice against a defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial in that county.” State v. Weatherford, 416 N.W.2d 47, 50 (S.D. 1987)
(citing SDCL 23A-17-5). “The test for change of venue is prejudice in the minds of
the county residents sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehension that the accused
will not receive a fair and impartial trial.” Smith, 477 N.W.2d at 32. The burden
rests upon the defendant to demonstrate he cannot receive a fair trial in a
particular county, and “[t]he law presumes that a defendant can receive a fair trial
in the county in which the offense is committed.” Weatherford, 416 N.W.2d at 50.
[¶31.] “Pretrial publicity alone is not enough to deny a fair trial or, to
warrant a change of venue.” Smith, 477 N.W.2d at 32. “There must be additional
evidence tending to show that such publicity was so prejudicial as to prevent the
defendant from receiving a fair and impartial trial in the county.” Id. We have
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recognized that “voir dire examination is the better forum for ascertaining the
existence of hostility towards the accused.” State v. Garza, 1997 S.D. 54, ¶ 21, 563
N.W.2d 406, 410 (quoting Boykin v. Leapley, 471 N.W.2d 165, 168 (S.D. 1991)).
[¶32.] Here, Krueger’s motion for change of venue included seven articles
published in the local Huron newspaper. There is no showing that this coverage
was inaccurate, misleading, or inflammatory. See State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860,
867 (S.D. 1979) (discussing defendant’s failure to show that pretrial publicity was
prejudicial). One article actually included a quote from the state’s attorney
reminding readers “that the state has not proven anything in the case and that the
defendant is presumed innocent and should be treated that way.”
[¶33.] After considering the parties’ arguments, the circuit court denied the
motion to transfer venue, although it indicated, “[W]e will take it up again after the
Vega trial.”4 But when Vega elected to forego a trial and plead guilty to first-degree
manslaughter, Krueger did not renew his motion, and the circuit court did not
readdress the motion sua sponte. Krueger argues that the court erred first, by
denying the motion and, second, by not unilaterally revisiting the issue “after the
Vega trial.” We will address the arguments separately.
[¶34.] First, we do not believe the circuit court abused its discretion by
denying the motion to change venue. The motion was largely based upon the
4. At the motion hearing, Krueger asked the circuit court to consider granting
the motion “now” or holding it in abeyance until after the Vega trial. The
State argues that Krueger abandoned the issue by allowing the motion to be
held in abeyance. Our view of the record convinces us that the court did not
hold the motion in abeyance, but rather denied the motion on its merits.
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pretrial media coverage and the general allegation of the case’s notoriety.5 The
handful of news articles contained in the record, however, do not support the idea
that Krueger would be unable to obtain a trial by fair and impartial jurors. There is
no allegation the reports are inaccurate or unnecessarily sensational, and we
conclude they relate to a matter of public safety and community interest.
[¶35.] Nevertheless, voir dire examination is the best means to determine
whether potential jurors have preconceptions they would be unable to set aside to
render an impartial verdict. See Garza, 1997 S.D. 54, ¶ 21, 563 N.W.2d at 410.
Here, the circuit court allowed a careful voir dire process over the course of two
days. The court also utilized a comprehensive and specific juror questionnaire that
asked prospective jurors a number of questions, including whether they had “heard
or read anything about this case . . . .”
[¶36.] Through counsel, Krueger engaged in meaningful discussions with
prospective jurors, and the individuals who were selected to serve as jurors
indicated they could decide the case solely upon the evidence presented at trial.
During the course of voir dire, Krueger challenged five prospective jurors for cause,
and the circuit court ultimately granted each challenge and excused all five
individuals. In our view, Krueger has not identified any evidence from the record
that would support a claim that he was unable to obtain a fair and impartial jury.
Krueger points instead to aspects of the newspaper articles that recount details of
the murder investigation and contain collateral allegations of drug trafficking.
5. The case was originally designated as a capital case, but the State later
withdrew its notice to seek the death penalty.
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However, these facts do not render pervasive community prejudice self-evident, and
the court’s decision to deny a change of venue was within its discretion.
[¶37.] Next, Krueger has not preserved his additional claim that the circuit
court should have revisited the venue issue sua sponte. We view the court’s
statement about “tak[ing] [the venue issue] up again after the Vega trial” as an
expression of its willingness to entertain a renewed motion to change venue after
Vega’s trial. Strictly speaking, this predicate never occurred because Vega admitted
his guilt and did not have a jury trial with the corresponding level of media
coverage and public interest. Regardless, if Krueger wanted to address his motion
to transfer venue again, he should have renewed it to the circuit court. In the
absence of such a request, our review is limited by the strictures of the plain error
doctrine.
[¶38.] “We invoke our discretion under the plain error rule cautiously and
only in exceptional circumstances.” State v. McMillen, 2019 S.D. 40, ¶ 13, 931
N.W.2d 725, 729 (quoting State v. Bariteau, 2016 S.D. 57, ¶ 24, 884 N.W.2d 169,
177). “To establish plain error, an appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain,
(3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may this Court exercise its discretion
to notice the error if, (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id., 931 N.W.2d at 429-30 (quoting State v.
Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 27, 889 N.W.2d 404, 412). Here, Krueger has not identified
a compulsory legal standard or any developments in the case after the motion to
change venue was denied that would have required the circuit court to reconsider
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Krueger’s venue motion again and change its earlier ruling. Accordingly, Krueger
cannot demonstrate error, much less plain error.
3. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it
refused to strike expert testimony regarding DNA
recovered from the black Velcro shoes.
[¶39.] Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Stone, 2019 S.D. 18, ¶ 22, 925 N.W.2d 488, 497. We also review a circuit court’s
decision “to admit or deny an expert’s testimony under the abuse of discretion
standard.” State v. Kvasnicka, 2013 S.D. 25, ¶ 18, 829 N.W.2d 123, 128 (quoting
State v. Lemler, 2009 S.D. 86, ¶ 18, 774 N.W.2d 272, 278). “Under this standard,
not only must error be demonstrated, but it must also be shown to be prejudicial.”
Stone, 2019 S.D. 18, ¶ 22, 925 N.W.2d at 497 (quoting Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 12,
889 N.W.2d at 408).
[¶40.] Expert testimony is governed by SDCL 19-19-702, which provides that
“[a] witness who is qualified as an expert . . . may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if . . . the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.” The basis of the
expert’s opinion may be derived from “facts or data that the expert has been made
aware of or personally observed.” SDCL 19-19-703. “[W]hile there must be some
factual data to support the opinion of an expert, these facts need not be admissible
in evidence to support the expert testimony.” Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816,
820 (S.D. 1991).
[¶41.] Here, Krueger’s challenge to the expert DNA opinions of forensic
scientist Amber Bell does not implicate her methodology or the soundness of the
scientific principles. Instead, Krueger’s argument is based on the circuit court’s
subsequent decision not to admit the black Velcro shoes seized by Agent Spencer
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and attributed to Krueger. He reasons by implication that since the court
determined the shoes were inadmissible, then Bell’s testimony about samples taken
from the shoes must necessarily be excluded. This proxy argument presumes that
the circuit court correctly refused to admit the actual black Velcro shoes attributed
to Krueger, but we believe the association he suggests between this ruling and the
decision not to strike Bell’s testimony is not determinative.
[¶42.] We can summarize the circuit court’s two evidentiary rulings
concerning the black Velcro shoes as follows:
1) The black Velcro shoes Agent Spencer seized were not admitted
during this testimony because Bell “never identified those as the
ones that she examined.”
2) But there was, nevertheless, sufficient evidence contained in the
broader trial record that allowed the court to conclude that Bell did,
in fact, analyze samples taken from Krueger’s shoes that were
otherwise unchanged from their condition when Agent Spencer
seized them. As the court explained, Bell did not “need to
necessarily have the shoes present here for her to give her opinion.”
[¶43.] We are not reviewing the court’s first evidentiary ruling, which may or
may not reflect a proper exercise of the court’s discretion.6 Nor do we believe its
static nature compels the answer to the issue involving the second ruling, which
implicates chain of custody principles. Instead, we are reviewing only the merits of
the court’s refusal to strike Bell’s expert DNA testimony using our well-established
abuse of discretion standard. Insofar as the court’s rationale for this specific
decision is concerned, there was no abuse of discretion.
6. The State has not sought review of the circuit court’s decision to exclude the
shoes.
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[¶44.] Circuit courts have “broad discretion in determining ‘the competency of
chain of custody evidence.’” State v. Reay, 2009 S.D. 10, ¶ 22, 762 N.W.2d 356, 363
(quoting State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 901 (S.D. 1993)). However, “a perfect
chain of custody is not required.” State v. Shepard, 2009 S.D. 50, ¶ 11, 768 N.W.2d
162, 165. “Rather, ‘the trial judge must be satisfied in reasonable probability that
the object sought to be admitted is the one involved in the case, and that it has not
changed in important aspects.’” Id. (quoting Reay, 2009 S.D. 10, ¶ 22, 762 N.W.2d
at 363).
[¶45.] Bell testified that Houck’s DNA was found on samples taken from
shoes she analyzed. Though her testimony may have been somewhat preliminary,
Agent Spencer was the State’s next witness, and he testified that he had seized
Krueger’s black Velcro shoes after he was booked into jail. The shoes appeared to
be stained, possibly with blood, so he packaged them and requested that the state
crime laboratory conduct serology and DNA testing. Spencer logged the shoes into
an evidence-tracking system using a bar code that corresponded to Krueger’s case
and then physically transferred the evidence to laboratory personnel. Bell testified
that the state crime laboratory uses the same system of tracking evidence. During
testimony outside the presence of the jury, she also confirmed that she had viewed
photographs of the shoes and observed the stains on them. A photograph of the
black Velcro shoes with visible stains was admitted during Spencer’s testimony
without objection.
[¶46.] Though the State’s evidence relating to the chain of custody could have
been presented in a clearer manner, we believe the evidence sufficiently established
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that Bell did, in fact, analyze Krueger’s black Velcro shoes. Agent Spencer sent the
shoes to the state crime laboratory for testing which, Bell explained, involved
making cuts in the shoes to obtain material for sample swabs. Spencer also
testified the shoes, altered as a result of the testing, were later returned to him with
a label from the state crime laboratory. It appears only one pair of shoes was
attributed to Krueger, and Bell testified that only one pair of shoes was tested for
DNA. Krueger, for his part, did not challenge Bell’s testimony regarding the shoes
under a chain of custody theory until the circuit court denied the State’s second
request to admit the shoes.7
[¶47.] However, even without Bell’s testimony, there was no discernible
impact on the jury’s verdict, and the error, if any, was harmless. The State’s case
against Krueger was strong. He confessed to killing Houck and told investigators
they could find Houck’s body at his farm where, in fact, the body was discovered.
Krueger was motivated to kill Houck because of harassment he perceived Houck
was inflicting upon members of Krueger’s family, and text messages point
7. At trial, Krueger argued that Bell’s DNA opinions regarding the shoes
violated his right of confrontation because a different, non-testifying analyst
had cut the fabric from the shoes to make the testing swabs, citing our
decision in State v. Medicine Eagle, 2013 S.D. 60, 835 N.W.2d 886. He has
abandoned the confrontation issue on appeal, and now claims that Bell’s
testimony should have been excluded because it was not relevant in the
absence of her testimony that they belonged to Krueger. However, Krueger
did not make a relevancy argument at trial, and his claim that Bell failed to
sufficiently attribute the shoes to Krueger came after the close of the
evidence in the form of a motion to strike Bell’s testimony because “it hasn’t
been connected up.” For this reason, we believe the evidentiary question here
presents only the question whether Bell, in fact, analyzed Krueger’s black
Velcro shoes—not a question of relevancy.
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specifically to a plan with Vega to kill Houck. Although Bell’s DNA evidence placed
Krueger in proximity to Houck perhaps at the time he was mortally injured, this is
no more convincing than Krueger’s own unsolicited confession.
4. Whether the circuit court committed error by failing to
strike the State’s comments during closing argument or
issue a curative instruction.
[¶48.] “Prosecutorial misconduct implies a dishonest act or an attempt to
persuade the jury by use of deception or by reprehensible methods.” Bariteau, 2016
S.D. 57, ¶ 23, 884 N.W.2d at 177 (quoting State v. Hayes, 2014 S.D. 72, ¶ 23, 855
N.W.2d 668, 675). There are “no hard and fast rules [that] exist which state with
certainty when prosecutorial misconduct reaches a level of prejudicial error which
demands reversal of the conviction and a new trial; each case must be decided on its
own facts.” McMillen, 2019 S.D. 40, ¶ 27, 931 N.W.2d at 733 (quoting State v.
Stetter, 513 N.W.2d 87, 90 (S.D. 1994)).
[¶49.] During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor said:
And the last thing I would say, I think [defense counsel is]
absolutely right. Go out and explain it. And I think - - I know
Don Houck. I met him over the last year and a half because of
this . . . . He [sic] sitting in my office. He says the defendant
killed my boy. He killed my boy.
Krueger’s attorney objected stating, “I believe this is improper argument.” The
circuit court sustained the objection. The State then continued in its closing
argument with no further comments regarding Don Houck. Krueger did not request
a curative instruction or ask the court to strike the prosecutor’s comments about
Houck’s father.
[¶50.] The State does not argue that the prosecutor’s comments were proper,
and we determine they were not. Instead, the State claims that Krueger effectively
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prevailed on this issue before the circuit court because the court sustained his
objection, and there was no further improper argument. Implicit in the State’s
position is the question of whether Krueger forfeited his claim that the circuit court
should have struck the prosecutor’s comments or instructed jurors to disregard
them by not asking for that relief.8 If the error was not preserved, we would review
the argument for plain error rather than the abuse of discretion standard that
otherwise guides our review of prosecutorial misconduct claims. See State v. Hayes,
2014 S.D. 72, ¶ 22, 855 N.W.2d 668, 674-75 (citation omitted) (“The standard of
review for prosecutorial misconduct claims is abuse of discretion.”).
[¶51.] However, whether Krueger’s objection to the comment was sufficient to
preserve the claim Krueger now raises on appeal has not been developed further in
the briefs, and we have not previously confronted the question.9 Under the
circumstances, we believe it is unnecessary to reach it here because the strength of
the State’s evidence and a close examination of the improper comment convinces us
that it did not affect the jury’s verdict under any standard of review. See State v.
8. The circuit court’s instructions conditioned the jury to expect that the
attorneys would object during the testimony of witnesses and advised jurors
that they should not “be influenced by [an] objection.” The court further
explained that if it sustained an objection, jurors “must ignore the question,
and must not try to guess what the answer might have been.” Although
there is no similar instruction relating to objections sustained during the
arguments of counsel, the court did instruct the jury that closing arguments
were not evidence and that “statements of counsel not supported by evidence
or a fair inference drawn therefrom should not be considered by you in
arriving at your verdict.”
9. At least one other court has addressed this issue and held that an objection to
a prosecutor’s improper closing argument does not preserve a claim that the
trial court should have ordered the comment stricken and issued a curative
instruction. See State v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760, 766 (S.C. 1997).
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Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, ¶ 52, 599 N.W.2d 344, 355 (citation omitted) (holding
prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial when it “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting convictions a denial of due process”).
[¶52.] Although the circuit court did not act sua sponte to strike the
prosecutor’s statement about Don Houck or instruct the jury to disregard it, the fact
remains that the court did correctly sustain defense counsel’s “improper argument”
objection. At a minimum, therefore, the jurors were aware of the court’s
determination that the argument was not proper. The prosecutor, for his part,
accepted the ruling, and there were no additional instances of improper argument.10
[¶53.] We are aware that the prosecutor made the remarks about Don Houck
during the State’s rebuttal closing argument at a time when Krueger’s attorney
would not be able to respond. However, the prosecutor’s improper comments, in
context, were offered after restating a summary of the evidence as a response to
defense counsel’s rhetorical question about how jurors would explain the facts of the
case to their “coworkers . . . and family members . . . .”
[¶54.] Beyond this, we do not understand how the comments attributed to
Don Houck were fundamentally different from Krueger’s own unsolicited statement
to Deputy Ball that he had killed Houck with a baseball bat. Indeed, given the
10. Krueger’s reliance upon Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, 599 N.W.2d 344, is misplaced
because the decision does little to assist his argument. Despite the fact the
prosecutor in Smith made multiple improper comments during closing
argument, the defendant could not obtain relief on appeal given the strength
of the evidence against him. Here too, the prosecutor’s isolated comment is
insufficient to support a due process violation given the strength of the
evidence.
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overwhelming evidence of guilt, we cannot accept Krueger’s claim that the
prosecutor’s comments suggested Don Houck possessed other information to which
the jury was not privy. Instead, the most logical interpretation of the prosecutor’s
comments about Don Houck is that Don believed Krueger was guilty based on the
evidence outlined in the State’s closing argument. We are similarly unpersuaded
that the prosecutor’s comments enflamed the jurors’ passions by improperly
engendering sympathy.
5. Whether the circuit court’s cumulative errors deprived
Krueger of a fair trial.
[¶55.] Based upon our determinations of the previous issues, we decline to
address whether there was cumulative error. See New v. Weber, 1999 S.D. 125, ¶
25, 600 N.W.2d 568, 577 (“Having found no one issue sufficient to declare [counsel’s]
representation deficient or prejudicial, we cannot now say that the sum of any
errors requires a new trial.”).
Outcome: Krueger’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, and the circuit
court’s decisions to deny his request to strike the expert DNA testimony and his
motion to change venue were not outside the range of permissible discretionary
choices. Finally, the court’s refusal to sua sponte strike the prosecutor’s comment
about Houck’s father or issue a curative instruction does not constitute error under
any standard of review. We affirm.
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